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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael Hager contends the district court failed to conduct the required analysis on
evidence which it recognized fell under I.R.E. 404(b).  The State does not contest that point.
Rather, it raises the new argument that the testimony was not subject to I.R.E. 404(b) in the first
place because it was facts relating to the overarching criminal episode.  In making that argument,
the State does not address the recent decision in State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 573-74 (2017),
in which the Supreme Court expressly refused to endorse the admission of evidence just to
provide context when that evidence is not otherwise admissible under the Rules of Evidence.
Mr. Hager also asserts that the testimony in question was not admissible under
I.R.E. 404(b).  The State responds it was relevant to his motive.  However, since the past verbal
argument does not make it more likely that Mr. Hager engaged in the physical acts alleged in this
case, the testimony about the prior argument is not admissible as evidence of motive under
I.R.E. 404(b).  Additionally, the State does not address the risk of undue prejudice that exists in
the admission of that propensity evidence, which, in this case, substantially outweighs whatever
minimal probative value that testimony might have had.
Finally, the State’s argument that the erroneous admission of that testimony was harmless
is directly contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508
U.S. 275, 279-80 (1993), as the State argues this Court should do precisely what the United
States Supreme Court said it cannot do, lest it violate Mr. Hager’s constitutional right to a trial
by jury.
For all those reasons, this Court should reject the State’s arguments, vacate Mr. Hager’s
judgment of conviction, and remand this case for a new trial.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Hager’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Whether the district court failed to use the proper standard when it overruled Mr. Hager’s
objection to the admission of improper propensity evidence.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Failed To Use The Proper Standard When It Overruled Mr. Hager’s Objection
To The Admission Of Improper Propensity Evidence
A. Despite Recognizing The Testimony At Issue Was Subject To I.R.E. 404(b), The District
Court Did Not Conduct Either Part Of The Requisite Analysis Under That Rule
The district court specifically recognized the testimony to which Mr. Hager had objected
was subject to I.R.E. 404(b).  (Tr., p.281, Ls.8-9 (“I think it’s 404(b) kind of stuff”).  The
prosecutor below did not contest that conclusion.  (See generally Tr., p.280, L.17 - p.281, L.11
(the entirety of the argument and decision on defense counsel’s objection under I.R.E. 404(b)).)
Nevertheless, on appeal, the State argues that the objected-to testimony about the prior argument
was not subject to I.R.E. 404(b).  (Resp. Br., pp.12-13.)
It is not proper for the State to argue for affirming the district court’s decision on a theory
it did not argue below. State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, ___, 404 P.3d 659, 663 (2017), reh’g
denied.   “‘It  is  manifestly  unfair  for  a  party  to  go  into  court  and  slumber,  as  it  were,  on  his
defense, take no exception to the ruling, present no point for the attention of the court, and seek
to present his defense that was never mooted before, to the judgment of the appellate court.’” Id.
(quoting Smith v. Sterling, 1 Idaho 128, 131 (1867)); accord State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162
Idaho 271, ___, 396 P.3d 700, 704-05 (2017) (adding that “[t]his requirement applies equally to
all parties on appeal”), reh’g denied.  Therefore, the State’s argument that this testimony was not
subject to review under I.R.E. 404(b) is not properly raised in this appeal, since that argument
was not presented below.
At any rate, the district court was correct that this testimony was subject to review under
I.R.E. 404(b).  The testimony was about an argument which had occurred sometime before the
incident in question.  (See Tr., p.279, L.19 - p.282, L.20.)  The facts about that argument had no
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tendency to make J.A.’s account of what happened in the cab of the truck more or less likely to
be accurate.  For example, the fact that Mr. Hager had gotten into a verbal argument with J.A. on
that previous occasion did not make it more or less probable that he physically assaulted her on
this occasion, particularly when the prior argument did not have a physical component.  Nor did
the fact that Mr. Hager would bring up that prior argument in subsequent verbal altercations
make it  more or less probable that he physically assaulted her on this occasion.  Similarly, the
facts about what was discussed during that prior argument did not make J.A.’s version of events
in the cab of the truck more or less likely.  Rather, all those facts were only relevant to try to
show that Mr. Hager has an irrationally-jealous character and that he acted in accordance with
that purported character.  Therefore, that testimony was subject to I.R.E. 404(b). See, e.g.,
State v. Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 949 (Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that evidence about other acts
which bear upon the defendant’s character is subject to I.R.E. 404(b)).
Furthermore, the State’s assertion – that this evidence is not subject to I.R.E. 404(b)
because it was describing events surrounding the alleged crime (Resp. Br., p.13) – is contrary to
the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Kralovec, 161 Idaho at 573-74, which the State does not
acknowledge at all.  (See generally Resp. Br.)  As indicated above, the fact that the prior
argument occurred, and the details of that prior argument, are not relevant to any of the elements
of  either  of  the  two  charged  offenses  (domestic  battery  and  attempted  strangulation).   (See
R., pp.60-61.)  Therefore, the State’s reliance on State v. Sams, 160 Idaho 917, 919-20 (Ct. App.
2016), rev. denied, is misplaced.
Rather, under the State’s argument, those facts were merely offered to place the events in
the cab in context of nearby or nearly contemporaneous happenings (the argument earlier in the
evening which included references to the past argument).  That mere proximity of events,
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however, is not a valid basis to admit evidence if that evidence is not otherwise admissible under
the Rules of Evidence. Kralovec, 161 Idaho at 573-74.  Therefore, this testimony must still be
assessed under I.R.E. 404(b) before it can be properly admitted.
Despite properly recognizing that I.R.E. 404(b) applied, the district court failed to
conduct  either  aspect  of  the  analysis  required  under  that  rule. See, e.g., State v. Sheldon, 145
Idaho 225, 230 (2007) (holding, while evaluating the notice provision of the rule, that
compliance with I.R.E. 404(b) is mandatory and a condition precedent to admission of evidence
under that rule).  The State does not contest Mr. Hager’s analysis in that regard.  (See generally
Resp. Br.)
The district court’s failure to conduct that required analysis is, itself, reversible error.
See, e.g., State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009).  In Grist, the Idaho Supreme Court found error
in the fact that the district court had not articulated the basis on which it had found the propensity
evidence to be relevant. Id.; compare State v. Marks, 156 Idaho 559, 565 (2014) (noting that a
trial court’s actual identification of the permissible basis for admission of evidence is sufficient
to meet this obligation on the relevance prong of the test), rev. denied.  Without a determination
under the first prong of that test to review, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of
conviction and remanded the case. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52.
By not identifying a non-propensity purpose to which this evidence might have been
relevant, and by not conducting the balancing test, the district court in this case made the same
error the district court in Grist did.  Therefore, the same result is appropriate here.  Because the
district court failed to use the proper standard, to conduct the proper analysis, this Court should
vacate the judgment of conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
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B. The Testimony At Issue Was Not Admissible Under I.R.E. 404(b) As Evidence Of
Motive
Should this Court depart from Grist and  assess  the  admissibility  of  the  propensity
evidence in this case, that evidence was not relevant to a non-propensity purpose.  Specifically,
the State contends that evidence was relevant to motive.  (Resp. Br., p.15; compare Tr., p.280,
L.17 - p.281, L.11 (the prosecutor below not identifying any basis upon which that evidence
might be relevant under I.RE. 404(b).)  “Motive” is “something (as a need or desire) that causes
a  person  to  act.”   MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS, 528 (2007); accord
State v. Pepcorn, 152 Idaho 678, 689 (2012) (“Motive is generally defined as that which leads or
tempts the mind to indulge in a particular act.”).  However, evidence of motive is only
admissible under I.R.E. 404(b) when it “tend[s] to make it more probable that the person in
question did the act.” State v. Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 308 (2014); see also Grist, 147 Idaho at 54
(reiterating the need for limits on the admission of propensity evidence, particularly in sex abuse
cases).  As noted in Section A, supra,  the acts in question here were physical assaults,  and the
facts about a prior verbal argument, which did not have a physical component, do not make it
more or less likely that Mr. Hager engaged in the alleged physical acts.  Thus, the evidence about
the prior argument was not relevant to motive, as that concept is understood under I.R.E. 404(b).
And even if that evidence were minimally-relevant to the question of motive, that
probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice.  In arguing to the
contrary, the State does not address the risk of prejudice actually created by admitting propensity
evidence.   (See generally Resp. Br., pp.15-16.)  The actual risk of undue prejudice caused by
presenting propensity evidence is that it “takes the jury away from their primary consideration of
the guilt or innocence of the particular crime on trial,” leading them to convict a defendant based
on his character instead. Grist, 147 Idaho at 49.  Thus, the risk in this case is that the jury would
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convict  Mr.  Hager,  that  the  jurors  would  overlook  reasonable  doubts  about  his  guilt  of  the
alleged conduct in the cab of the truck, based on the propensity evidence’s portrayal of his
character.
The State’s argument under this second prong of I.R.E. 404(b) only reasserts the district
court’s conclusion that this evidence was not prejudicial because it was “relationship stuff”
which did not involve an act of violence.  (See Resp. Br., pp.15-16.)  However, neither of those
facts bear on whether the jury might convict Mr. Hager based on his portrayed character, rather
than actual guilt of the charged conduct.  Therefore, the State’s argument on the second part of
the analysis under I.R.E. 404(b) is actually irrelevant to that analysis.
Furthermore, the risk of undue prejudice is substantial in this case because the jury had to
make a credibility determination between J.A.’s account and Mr. Hager’s account about what
happened in the cab of the truck.  Therefore, there is a risk that the jury rejected Mr. Hager’s
account based on the propensity evidence’s portrayal of his character. Compare State v. Joy, 155
Idaho 1, 11-12 (2013) (vacating a conviction in light of the risk that propensity evidence had
prejudiced a credibility determination central to the verdict).  Thus, the minimal relevance of that
evidence to motive is substantially outweighed by the risk of that undue prejudice in this case.
As such, even if this Court considers the merits of admitting the evidence under I.R.E. 404(b), it
should still vacate Mr. Hager’s conviction.
C. The  State’s  Argument  Under  The  Harmless  Error  Doctrine  Asks  This  Court  To  Do
Precisely What The United States Supreme Court  Has Held It  Cannot Do – Presume A
Verdict Not Actually Rendered In Violation Of His Constitutional Right To A Jury Trial
The State contends that this Court should hold the improper admission of this propensity
evidence harmless because “[e]ven if the jury had not heard about the source of the argument,
the jury verdict would have been the same.”  (Resp. Br., p.17.)  The United States Supreme
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Court has squarely rejected that precise sort of analysis because engaging in that sort of analysis
violates the Sixth Amendment’s promise of a trial by jury. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 (citing
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).  Idaho uses the same test to assess whether an
objected-to error is harmless. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).
Specifically, Sullivan explained  that  a  court  using  the  harmless  error  test  must  look  at
“the basis on which the jury actually rested its verdict.” Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 (emphasis
from original) (internal quotation omitted).  “The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a
trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered . . . .” Id.
Yet that is precisely what the State now asks this Court to consider – whether the verdict would
have been the same in a trial where the error had not occurred, where “the jury had not heard [the
improper evidence], the jury verdict would have been the same.”  (Resp. Br., p.17.)  Therefore,
the State’s argument is directly contrary to the standard for harmless error clearly established by
the United States Supreme Court.
That State’s proposed analysis is particularly problematic because, “to hypothesize a
guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered,” as the State does here, “no matter how
inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be—would violate the jury-trial
guarantee.” Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279.  “The Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate
speculation about a hypothetical jury’s action.” Id. at 280.  Therefore, this Court should reject
the State’s harmless error argument, which promotes violating the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
As that erroneous assertion was the State’s only argument under the harmless error
doctrine (see generally Resp. Br., pp.16-17), it has failed to offer argument in regard to, much
less meet, its actual burden under that doctrine. See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 (requiring the State
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to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was
surely unattributable to the error.”) (emphasis from original); accord Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
Because the State failed to make any argument in regard to its actual burden of proof, this Court
should vacate Mr. Hager’s conviction based on the erroneous admission of that propensity
evidence. See, e.g., Garcia-Rodriguez, 396 P.3d at 705 (refusing to consider the State’s
contention which was not supported by cogent argument when the State bore the burden on
appeal).
And even if the State had tried to meet its burden, it could not have done so.  A few hours
into deliberations, the jury sent out two questions which revealed that they were struggling to
reach a unanimous verdict on the attempted strangulation charge.  (Tr., 424, Ls.3-24; PSI,
pp.172-73.)  Because the only testimony in regard to that charge came from Mr. Hager and J.A.,
there is a reasonable possibility that the improper propensity evidence affected the jurors’
determination of which of the two accounts was accurate.  Thus, the State cannot show, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the verdict actually rendered in this case.
Compare Joy, 155 Idaho at 11-12 (holding the improper admission of propensity evidence was
not harmless in a case where the verdict was based on a similar credibility determination).  That
conclusion is particularly true in light of the jury’s questions, which indicated at least three jurors
were harboring doubts about the sufficiency of the State’s evidence in that regard. Compare
State v. Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, ___, 342 P.3d 628, 631-32 (2015) (holding an error was not
harmless in light of a similar jury question).  As such, the erroneous admission of the propensity
evidence in this case was not harmless.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Hager respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand
this case for a new trial.
DATED this 21st day of December, 2017.
___________/s/______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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